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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
.1.\Y~E

\\'ETHERELL CHASE,
Plaint ijj"-Appclla11f,

Case
No. 9919

-vs.~~ll\\'IX .\~lOS < ~HA~E,

JR.,
/)('fend a 11 t-U cs pan dent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATE~IENT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an appeal from an order made as a result of
an Order to Show Cause. The court, by its action, deprived the plaintiff, the mother, of the custody of her twoYl'ar-old rhild. One of the questions involved is whether
the evidenre justified this separation. Also involved is
the question of the propriety of terminating the requirenwnt that deft'ndant pay plaintiff the sum of $60.00 per
month a~ child support and the propriety of denying
plaintiff any attorney fees for her defense of the Order
tn Show Cause.
DISPOSITIOX IX LOWER COURT
Thi~ case was tried to the court on May 6, 1963, on

defendant·~ Order to Show Cause and plaintiff's Affidavit
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and Motion for Attorney Fees. From an Order in favor
of Defendant, plaintiff appeals.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Judgment and Order
and judgment in her favor as a matter of law and equity,
or that failing, a new hearing before an unbiased judge.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, Jane Wetherell Chase, and the defendant, Edwin Amos Chase, Jr., were married at Nephi,
Utah, on the 29th day of August, 1958. (R-2) They
had two children born as issue of the marriage : Richard
Edwin Chase, who died on the 14th day of October, 1959,
and Robert Leon Chase, a boy, born October 10, 1960,
who survives and who was two years and seven months
old at the time of the hearing of the Order to Show
Cause (Tr. 4).
The evidence and record shows that the defendant,
prior to the divorce, came home intoxicated, left the plaintiff for considerable periods of time, left plaintiff to her
own means of support for months at a time and remained
absent from the residence of the parties for months at
a time (R-17). It further shows that at the time of divorce the plaintiff contemplated employment in Salt
Lake City at a salary in excess of $300.00 per month
(R-15, 16) which employment she obtained and has continued at until the date of the Order to Show Cause (Tr.
56). While plaintiff was working she made arrangements
2
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ft,r the infant rhild to stay with his maternal grandmother
in ~Pphi rrr. ;>7) Where She Visited him every Weekend
f1·om Friday night to tlw late hours of Sunday (Tr. 57).
Tht> undi:-4putl'd evidence of plaintiff showed that she
could not obtain nursery care for the child until he was
two yPnrs old (Tr. 57) and that she intended to, and did,
bring the child to Salt Lake City to reside with her and
her present husband in November of 1962 (Tr. 58), when
he wns just a few days older than two years of age.

The C'ddence shows that the defendant did not wish
the child to be taken to Salt Lake City although he denied
that he pleaded or begged plaintiff not to take the child
with lwr as plaintiff testified (Tr. 58 and 19) but admittl'd that he asked her not to take the child away.
At no time was there any claim whatsoever that
plaintiff wns in any way unfit nor was any claim made
that the child had not received excellent care. Defendnut testified that the plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Wetherell,
was "exrellent to him" (Tr. 12 and 23) and that the
child remained with Mrs. Wetherell at his request
(Tr. 23).
Defendant testified that he had remarried (Tr. 4-5),
that he has another child eight months of age and that
he is a cook who works from 4 :00 a.m. to 11 :00 a.m. and
from 6 :00 to 7 :30 p.m. seven days each week for which
work he earns approximately $500.00 per month before
deductions are taken from his wages (Tr. 5-6). He testified also that he lived with his wife and child in a
duplex and that his present wife loved the child.
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The plaintiff testified that she had remarried also
and resides with her present husband in Salt Lake Citr
at 1603 Wilson Avenue and that she is employed, as i~
her husband, and that she earns $390.00 per month and
her husband earns $500.00 or $600.00 per month (Tr.
55-56). She further testified that she and her husband
would be free from debt in October, 1963, and she could
remain home with her child (Tr. 56-58). Since the divorce of the parties, the plaintiff has been extremely
faithful in making trips to Nephi on nearly every weekend to visit with her child (Tr. 57) and has provided
the medical care necessary to repair a double hernia
which the child suffered (Tr. 71). The child ·was taken to
Salt Lake City in November of 1962 (Tr. 58-59) andreturned to Nephi a pproximatley one week later as a result
of an emotional appeal made by plaintiff's mother (Tr.
59-60). During the time he was in Salt Lake City he was
kept during the day in a reputable day nursery (Tr. 55)
and was cared for at night by his mother. Absolutely
no evidence was presented which would indicate that
he did not receive excellent care except the opinion evidence of defendant that it wasn't good for the child to
be put in a nursery (Tr. 24). Both spouses of the parties
testified they had feelings of love and affection for the
child. Defendant's wife stated she loved him (Tr. 37-38)
and plaintiff's husband stated he felt "as if he were
my own son" (Tr. 65). The wife of defendant, however,
showed by her testimony (Tr. 41) that she has endeavored
to roach the child not to care for his mother and further
testified that prior to the birth of her child, who is defendant's child, that she had to call the "beer joints" for
4
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clt•ft·ndant to come home because she was afraid to stay
nlone (Tr. 42-43) but that since she had given birth to
ht·r duughtPr she was not afraid to stay home and her
hu~band, thP defendant, stays out two or three nights a
\WPk plnyi11g pool because "he works hard" and "that
dol·~u·t hurt him." (Tr. 43)
The defendant's employer testified, over plaintiff's
objl•etion, that defendant had a good business reputation
in tlw community (Tr. 47). He further testified that he
and defendant played pool together ''night after night''
(Tr. 47), and that defendant owed him no obligation (Tr.
4S). Defendant, on the other hand, testified that he had
been "obligated to Ray for the last two years" (Tr. 5).
The court, in its order dated May 8, 1963, stated that
parents "rescued" the child from a. nursery
and furth('r stated that the word "rescued" was used
"advis('dly" (R-29) and also made much of the fact that
defendant's present wife is a. "very personable young
woman" (R-28) who will "be 20 years of age next
month·· (R-28). The court further stated that the child
""ill be better off by having a more stable home environment and the care and attention of parents who love
and care for him in their home than under the present
conditions.'' (R-29)
plaintiff'~

The Order awarding defendant the custody of the
child and terminating payments for support of the child
was entered accordingly.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CUSTODY OF THE MINOR CHILD, ROBERT
LEON CHASE, TO THE DEFENDANT.
Although a divorced mother has no absolute right
to the custody of minor children under U.C.A. 1953,
30-3-10, the policy of the Supreme Court of the State of
Utah has been to give weight to the view that, all things
being equal, preference should be given to the mother in
awarding custody of a child of tender years.
In the case of Briggs v. Briggs, 11 Utah 418, 181
Pac. 2d 223, the court held in a habeas corpus proceeding
between divorced parents for the custody of a child under
ten years of age that where there was no claim that the
mother was immoral or incompetent, she was entitled to
the custody of the child unless it was made to appear that
she was an improper person, and the burden of so showing was on the father. This was not shown in this case
and, as a matter of fact, there was absolutely no evidence
showing that the mother was anything other than a fine,
decent person.
To award the custody of a child to another woman,
who would be in charge of the child during nearly all his
waking hours, rather than to the natural mother is unnatural and abhorent. It should be done only when it is
clearly shown by the evidence that the best interests of
the child require such an order. This court in the case
of lVaUon v. Coffrna;n, 110 Utah 1, 169 Pac. 2d 97 said:

6
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'' \V e conclude that the determining consideration in eases of this kind is: What will be for the
ht>~t inh·n·~t and welfare of the child? That in determining this question there is a presumption
that it will be for the best interest and welfare of
the child to be reared under the care, custody and
control of its natural parent; that this presumption is not overcome unless from all the evidence
the trier of the fact is satisfied that the welfare of
the child requires that it be awarded to someone
other than its natural parent. Thus the ultimate
burden of proof on this question is always in favor
of the parent and against the other person.
·'In addition thereto, this presumption being
based on logic and natural inference, should be
kept in mind by the trier of the facts and weighed
and considered with all the other evidence in determining this question. The common experience
of mankind teaches 'that blood is thicker than
water,' that usually there is a much stronger attachment between a. natural parent and child than
is developed between a child and the foster parent,
that ordinarily the natural parent is willing to sacrifice its own interest and welfare for the benefit
of the rhild much more than is the case with foster
parents and that generally the natural parent is
more sympathetic and understanding and better
able to get the confidence and love of its own child
than anyone else, all of these things are especially
tn1e of the natural mother. That these facts should
always be kept in mind throughout the trial and
given due weight along with all other evidence in
the case in determining what will be for the best
interests and welfare of the child. However this
presumption is one of fact and not of law, and' may
be overcome by any competent evidence which is
suffirient to satisfy a reasonable mind thereon."
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No claim has been made that the plaintiff is unfit or
incompetent to care for her own child. There is no evidence to show that she has ever been anything but a loving, tender, thoughtful and devoted mother. She and her
husband are much better able to provide financially for
the child and can better educate and raise the child in
their home than can the defendant and his young wife
who is already burdened with the care of an infant of
her own. There is no question that defendant loves his
child but he has shown hy his actions in the past that he
has more liking for pool halls than he has for his home and
that he leaves his present wife alone with her infant child
on approximately one-half of the evenings each week.
Why the court stated that the child was was "rescued'' from a nursery school is not explainable. It is
only logical to believe that association with small children
of the same age under proper supervision is more beneficial to a child than would be the raising of a child with
young adults with no opportunity to learn or acquire
the ability to associate with children of his own age for
certain periods of time. This, in itself, however, is not
the determining factor in this case because the plaintiff
clearly indicated her intention to cease working in the
near future to devote herself to attending to the duties
of a debt-fee household in the company of her collegeeducated husband and her child.
The defendant made no complaints regarding the
manner in which the child was cared for by his maternal
grandparents and was perfectly willing to have the situation continue as it was until he found that plaintiff
8
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wn~

mnki 11.~ arrangements to have the child live with her
in lwr home in Halt Lake City and he then suddenly dist•ovPred that he, rather than plaintiff, would be confronted
with the Pxpense of traveling between Nephi and Salt
I.~nkP City in order to visit with his child.
The plaintiff, being the mother of the child, will undouhtPdly devote more time to her child, will show it
g-reater Jon' and affection than would any other person,
no matter how kind and willing she may be, and in spite
of the protPstations of defendant's wife that she loves
the child as much as she loves her own natural child, it
would be n'ry difficult for a twenty-year-old girl to be
absolutely impartial in her treatment of this child in the
event it would deprive her natural child of any material
and important thing. On the other hand, it is easier for
a man to accept the responsibility of caring for another
man's child. This is based on the premise that the greater
responsibility of caring for a child is placed upon the
woman.
The best interests of the child require that he be
placed with his mother as soon as possible.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN TERMINATING THE
REQUIRE:JIENT THAT DEFENDANT PAY
TO PLAINTIFF THE SUM OF $60.00 PER
:JIOXTH FOR THE CARE AND SUPPORT OF
THE MINOR CHILD.
The law is well settled and it is obvious that in the
event plaintiff has custody of the minor child there is a
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duty of defendant to assist in the support of his own
child.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
AWARD PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY FEES FOR
HER DEFENSE OF DEFENDANT'S ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE.
This point is also so well settled that no argument
is necessary.

CONCLUSION
The court, in this case, deprived the plaintiff of the
custody of her two-year-old child with no evidence that
she was in any way incompetent, improper or morally
unfit. By devious reasoning which was not based on any
evidence, a ruling was made which seemed to base a deprivation of a mother's right to custody of her child on
the basis that it was in some way unnatural to place a
child in a nursery school, and in some way so detrimental to the welfare of the child that he should be taken
away from the mother permanently.
The evidence sustains the finding that the plaintiff
loves her child, is willing to love and care for the child
and make sacrifices for him, and that she has always
done so in the past. Plaintiff will love the child more
and make more efforts in its behalf than can be expected
of a step-mother, who is little more than a child herself.
Plaintiff is ready, willing and able to make all sacri-

10
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fir£'s which a n• necessary to provide a comfortable, se<·un· and loving home life for her child.
On the basis of the evidence and the obvious facts,
tlw Order of tlw Dist rirt Court granting custody to the
defendant should be reversed and the father should be
ordered to eontribute to the support of his child. Plaintiff should further be allowed attorney fees not only for
the hearing in the District Court but also for this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,

ALAN H. BISHOP
343 South State Street
Salt Lake City 11, Utah
Attorney for Appellant
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